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In his May 2001 statement President Bush set forth a comprehensive policy on US 
nuclear weapons. In place of the Cold War concept of deterrence based on mutual 
assured destruction, Bush came up with ‘new concepts of deterrence’ with a broad 
strategy of active counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of defence. 
A new 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) seems to be a scenario for the US to 
construct a unilateral nuclear deterrence set-up on three legs of a ‘New Triad’: nuclear 
and non-nuclear offensive strike systems; active and passive defences; and a responsive 
infrastructure with new capabilities to meet emerging threats. 
Bush’s December 2001 announcement of US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM 
Treaty was a declaration of freedom to develop and eventually deploy ballistic missile 
defence (BMD) systems. Bush's stated mission for BMD is to protect the entirety of the 
US, its deployed forces, and its allies and friends, whereas both the NPR and Bush’s 
realist aides caution that the BMD need not be 100 per cent effective for deterrence. The 
logic of BMD behind its recurrences in various versions may be either that the US seeks 
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to secure freedom of power projection or that it attempts to establish control over space 
for both offensive and defensive purposes, or both. 
Bush’s November 2001 statement on the reductions in strategic nuclear 
warheads falls under the same framework of neo-deterrence along with the BMD. The 
announced level of 1,700-2,200 is actually higher than the 1997 Clinton-Yeltsin 
parameters on a START III. Bush's reductions are only in ‘operationally deployed’ 
warheads, contrary to the traditional rules for counting all deployed warheads as active 
forces. The strategic nuclear warheads taken off operational deployment will be 
maintained as part of the ‘responsive force’ to augment operationally deployed force if 
necessary. Nuclear warheads will not be destroyed. 
The essence of US nuclear weapons policy resides in the plan to use such 
arms. The leaked NPR report describes that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria 
are involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies that may require 
nuclear attack. Chinese contingencies could be immediate or potential. A Russian 
contingency is ‘not expected’ but its nuclear forces and programme remain a ‘concern’. 
US nuclear posture may be revised should its relations with Russia deteriorate 
significantly. The current deliberate executable war plans will be replaced by flexible 
‘adaptive’ planning. It has been uncovered by other sources that some 2,200 Russian 
targets are being held at risk, a fact that the nuclear weapons employment policy is 
basically unchanged from the Cold War concept. 
These policies and actions are contrary to the ‘willingness to pursue 
systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally’, as was 
reaffirmed by a joint statement of the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states in May 
2000. For a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament, new initiatives should be taken by all 
conceivable actors, states and NGOs, in whatever possible and positive forms. 
Especially important will be to resurrect and enrich the basic concept of ‘common 
security’ for global human security as opposed to the thriving ‘national security’ 
syndrome. 
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Prologue 
 
In May 2000 the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states (NWSs) -- China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- reaffirmed their ‘willingness to 
pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally’, in 
accordance with decision 2 (Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The stated efforts have not been made, 
however. In fact, words and  deeds since then, by the US in particular, have turned 
towards the opposite direction. 
In the arena of global measures, the Clinton administration failed in October 
1999 to win consent of the US Senate to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since completing the CTBT in 1996, the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been unable to negotiate any substantive measure on 
nuclear disarmament including a treaty on the cutoff of fissile material production. 
Bilateral relations between the two former nuclear adversaries have not fared 
any better. Despite delayed approval of ratification of the 1993 Treaty on Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by Russia in April 
2000, the treaty has not been put into force because of domestic politics in the two 
countries and their consequences. The new US administration under George W. Bush 
decided to go ahead with development and deployment of ballistic missile defences 
(BMD), a decision that had been put off by its predecessor. In November 2001 Bush 
unilaterally set a new framework of reducing strategic nuclear warheads. A month later 
his administration took a further step in announcing withdrawal within six months from 
the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), the 
cornerstone of US-USSR/Russian nuclear arms control. The September 11th incident in 
2001 evidently worked to reinforce Bush administration’s military posture. The US 
appears to be seeking to do away with the condition of mutual assured destruction 
(MAD) and to gain unrivalled superiority in military capabilities across the board. 
It has been fashionable for leaders of the former Cold War rivals to exchange 
rhetorical statements that the Cold War is over and that the foes have now become 
friends. In reality, however, the central tenet of nuclear war preparedness inherited from 
 - 108 - 
the Cold War era remains basically unchanged, although some alterations have been 
made. And so is the tendency of big powers to rely on military might as the final arbiter 
in international relations and particularly in dealing with geopolitical conflicts. 
All these have posed formidable obstacles in the way of eliminating nuclear 
weapons. In looking for clues for a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament, this paper 
examines Bush administration’s nuclear weapons policy by reviewing the new concepts 
of deterrence it has embraced and a new framework for such a deterrence which 
integrates enhanced offensive capabilities with defensive systems. 
 
Neo-Deterrence à la Bush 
 
US President George W. Bush made a comprehensive policy statement on US nuclear 
weapons for the first time on 1 May 2001. The address summed up some of the 
pronouncements he had made during his presidential campaign and after his 
inauguration, as well as relevant views expressed by his senior advisors. He publicly 
bade farewell to the Cold War deterrence strategy and attempted to bring in new 
concepts of deterrence. (Bush 2001a.) 
Bush’s concepts of neo-deterrence are based on a view that Russia is no longer 
an enemy of the US and that countries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and ballistic missiles are emerging as the new threats. His new deterrence, not different 
from various versions of deterrence of the Cold War era, relies on ‘both offensive and 
defensive forces’ and includes: a strategy to counter proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD); a framework to build ballistic missile defences (BMD); and further 
reductions in nuclear warheads within the new BMD framework. Bush placed greater 
emphasis on BMDs and went into some details of its project. (Ibid., 686-7.) On 13 
November 2001 he unveiled a US proposal on reductions to be achieved in the number 
of US-Russian strategic nuclear warheads. (Bush 2001b.) On 13 December 2001 Bush 
took a decisive step by announcing that the Russian government had been notified of 
the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty within six months. (Bush 2001c.) 
Prior to this announcement, the US had not offered amendments of the treaty to 
Moscow, conceded John R. Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security. (Bolton 2002, 7.) If elected president, Bush had stated, he would 
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‘offer’ Russia the necessary amendments to the ABM treaty so that US BMD 
deployment might be consistent with the treaty. (Bush 2000, 3.) 
In May 2001 President Bush characterised mutual assured destruction (MAD) 
relations between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War as one based on a 
‘grim premise’ of not exchanging nuclear strikes at the expense of mutual annihilation. 
With the mutual recognition of this threat, Bush found, the US and the USSR sought in 
the 1972 ABM Treaty to ensure survival of the two nations by leaving both sides 
completely ‘open and vulnerable to nuclear attack’. Today’s Russia, Bush declared, is in 
transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great democratic nation at peace with both 
itself and its neighbours. (Bush 2001a, 686.) 
Instead, Bush invited attention to ‘still a dangerous world’, with more nations 
having nuclear weapons and still more having ‘nuclear aspirations’. Many have 
chemical and biological weapons and some already have developed the ballistic missile 
technology, allowing them to deliver WMD at long distances. Among them are some of 
the ‘world’s least-responsible states’, Bush noted. According to his perception, today’s 
most urgent threat, different from the Cold War era, stems from a small number of 
missiles ‘in the hands of these states’. Some of ‘today’s tyrants’, he said, are gripped by 
an ‘implacable hatred’ of the US, its friends, and its institutions. This is why in such a 
world Cold War deterrence is ‘no longer enough’, Bush decided. (Ibid., 686-7.) 
The security Bush seeks is one based on more than the grim premise of MAD. 
It requires a new, broad strategy of ‘active nonproliferation, counter proliferation and 
defenses’. Both offensive and defensive forces are the cornerstone of Bush’s new 
concepts of deterrence. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the ‘incentive 
for proliferation’, he said. 
For such defenses, a new framework is needed for the US to build ‘missile 
defenses’ to counter different threats of the post-Cold War era. So the US must move 
‘beyond’ the 30 year old ABM Treaty, the US president declared. The US and  Russia, 
said Bush, should ‘leave behind’ the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a 
relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability, for the treaty ignores the 
‘fundamental breakthroughs in technology’ made since the treaty was concluded. They 
should replace it with a ‘new cooperative framework’, including in the area of missile 
defence, Bush suggested. (Ibid., 687-8.) 
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Two months later US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz went 
somewhat further into Bush’s new concepts of deterrence at a Senate committee. He 
said that the US aim during the Cold War was to deter one adversary from using an 
arsenal of existing weapons against the US. A deterrence framework the US is working 
to build for the 21st century, pointed out Wolfowitz, is not only to ‘deter’ multiple 
potential adversaries from using existing weapons, but to ‘dissuade’ them from 
developing dangerous new capabilities in the first place. This framework, he said, 
requires a ‘different approach to deterrence’ -- ‘layered defenses’ coupled with ‘layered 
deterrence’. Layered defences must be built to deal with missile threats ‘at different 
stages’, he remarked, while at the same time there should be a strategy of layered 
deterrence by developing a ‘mix of capabilities’ -- both offensive and defensive -- 
which would be capable of deterring and dissuading a ‘variety of emerging threats at 
different stages’. (Wolfowitz 2001.) 
Bush administration’s nuclear weapons policy should further be scrutinised by 
analysing unclassified published versions of the two classified official reports: a 
Pentagon briefing on the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) compiled by the US 
Department of Defense, along with an excerpted text of the same report which 
subsequently leaked out, and an unclassified summary of the 2002 US National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) worked out by the US Central Intelligence Agency.  
 
US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2002 
 
The classified US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2002 appears to have substantiated 
Bush administration’s new nuclear weapons policy, apparently incorporating renewed 
concepts that should have been formulated by reviewing implications of the out of the 
blue incident of September 11th in 2001. Unclassified sources give only sketchy 
descriptions of the secret official report which was submitted to Congress on 31 
December 2001. In his foreword to the NPR, US Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld wrote on 8 January 2002, the NPR was built on the Pentagon’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review. (US QDR 2001.) With the NPR, the Secretary of Defense pointed out, 
the US has introduced a ‘major change’ in the approach to the ‘role of nuclear offensive 
forces’ in its ‘deterrent strategy’ over the next five to ten years. A new US strategic 
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posture will be composed of three legs of a ‘New Triad’, which Rumsfeld summarised.1 
(1) Offensive strike systems, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The systems will be shifted 
to a ‘capabilities-based approach’ from the threat-based approach of the Cold War 
era, thereby providing a ‘credible deterrent at the lowest level’ of nuclear weapons. 
The goal of the lowest level is reduction to ‘1,700-2,200 operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads’ as announced by the president in November 2001. 
Reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and improved ability to deter attack are to 
be materialised by the addition of both ‘defenses’ and ‘non-nuclear strike forces’. 
(2) Defences, both active and passive. These defences will provide a range of 
capabilities to ‘dissuade terrorists or rogue states’ from threatening US and allied 
security by political, military, or technical means. And, 
(3) A responsive defensive infrastructure with new capabilities to meet emerging threats. 
This infrastructure will be translated into revitalising nuclear infrastructure capable 
of fielding ‘new generations of weapons systems’ to ‘dissuade’ adversaries from 
starting a competition in nuclear armaments. 
The New Triad depends for its effectiveness on ‘command and control, intelligence, and 
adaptive planning’, remarked the Pentagon’s chief, evidently suggesting that the Cold 
War era ‘C3 + I’ have been lifted to a new height by making use of recent technological 
achievements in the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). The QDR 
established the ‘foundation’ for post-Cold War US defence strategy while the New Triad 
introduced in the NPR is designed ‘for the decades to come’ by transforming the Cold 
War era offensive nuclear triad, Rumsfeld wrote. (Rumsfeld 2002.) 
A rough outline of the US NPR was sketched by US Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Policy J. D. Crouch at a special Pentagon briefing on 
9 January 2002. Crouch had chaired a senior steering group on the NPR, along with the 
director for Strategic Plans in the Joint Staff. 
During the Cold War era the US took a ‘threat-based approach’ and relied 
heavily on offensive nuclear forces, with the focus on the Soviet Union. But today, 
Crouch pointed out, the US has a ‘new relationship’ with Russia, which is following a 
much more positive course. Yet, Crouch cautioned, the US may face ‘multiple potential 
opponents’ but is not sure who they might be. In this situation, it is very hard to know 
the ‘who’ and ‘when’ the US might have to use its military forces broadly and even its 
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strategic forces more narrowly. But the US ‘do[es] or ought to plan’ the kinds of 
capabilities it needs to counter the capabilities of potential adversaries that are either 
extant today or will emerge in the years to come, he said. 
In this ‘new security environment’, Crouch continued, the US is trying to 
encourage a ‘positive relationship’ with Russia by establishing a ‘new framework’ in 
which the relations based on ‘mutual assured destruction’ (MAD) is to be brought to an 
end. The Cold War approach to deterrence, which was highly dependent upon offensive 
nuclear weapons, is no longer appropriate, Crouch noted. Yet, such weapons continue to 
play a ‘fundamental role’, he added. 
The NPR underscored the need for the US to ‘assure’ security partners, and 
‘dissuade’, ‘deter ’ and ‘defeat’ adversaries, and in the nuclear planning context, the US 
has adopted the concept of a ‘capabilities-based’ force, Crouch summed up. 
The ‘dissuasion’ as defined by Crouch is a condition in which the US is in a 
position where other countries that might try to challenge the US or might try to find 
‘asymmetrical’ ways of attacking the US are going to find it very difficult for two 
reasons. One is that the US will maintain sufficient forces to put itself ‘beyond the 
reach’ of those countries challenging to develop themselves as a peer competitor to the 
US. But secondly, Crouch observed, there will be a lot of cases where offensive nuclear 
retaliatory deterrence may ‘not be appropriate’ or the US may need other capabilities in 
the event nuclear ‘deterrence fails’, and these are where non-nuclear strike capabilities 
and missile defence capabilities would come into play.  
Crouch illustrated such cases with an example of ‘limited but effective 
defenses’, which, along with other tools, could well help the US to ‘dissuade’ countries 
from investing in large numbers of ballistic missiles that might threaten the US or its 
allies and friends. According to Crouch, the US would be equipped with forces and 
capabilities, including a missile defence, to ‘deter’ an attack by a WMD against itself 
while at the same time to ‘defeat’ that attack, whether it were to come out of the Middle 
East or some other place, as a far more preferable option. The US missile defence 
capability would be to dissuade prospective challengers from developing those missiles, 
Crouch said. (US NPR 2002, Briefing.) 
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New Sources of Threat 
 
Both active and passive defences, one of the three legs of a New Triad, are meant by 
Rumsfeld for providing a ‘range of capabilities’ for dissuasion. Such a range of military 
capabilities have usually been delineated on the basis of threat assessments and 
worst-case scenarios. Hence, room for intelligence manoeuvres to rationalise decisions 
on research, development, procurement, deployment, and employment of specific 
weapon systems. 
Earlier than the NPR, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had 
named Iraq, North Korea [DPRK: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea], Iran, Syria, 
and Libya as some of the countries that were ‘less than five years’ away from being 
capable of deploying missiles of increasing range and sophistication. (Wolfowitz 2001.) 
An unclassified summary of a US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 2002 
was made available to the public on 10 January 2002, right after the NPR. It sketches 
ballistic missile threat through 2015 as perceived by the US Intelligence Community 
(IC: CIA and 10 other agencies).2 Most IC agencies agree that ‘in addition to the 
longstanding missile forces of Russia and China’, the US most likely will face ‘ICBM 
threats’ from North Korea, Iran, and possibly Iraq before 2015. (One agency, 
presumably the Department of State, did not endorse the reference to Iran.) 
Specifically, the summary remarks, North Korea said it would delay flight 
testing of its Taepo Dong-2 missile until 2003 on the condition that its negotiations with 
the US go on. Iraq is estimated to be capable of testing ‘different ICBM concepts before 
2015’ if the UN prohibitions were eliminated in the next few years. But Iraq is unlikely 
to move in such a direction, according to most agencies. Iran could have a nuclear 
weapon by the end of the decade, while one agency observed it could take longer. Both 
Iraq and Iran are building missiles because of hostile relations with neighbouring 
countries. Israel is not mentioned, however. 
The unclassified summary admits that the intelligence community has shifted 
its focus from missile threat to non-missile threat because of the September 11th 
incident. US territory, concludes the NIE 2002, is more likely to be attacked with WMD 
by countries or terrorist groups using such non-missile means as ‘ships, trucks, airplanes 
or other means’, a conclusion different from the earlier estimates. Reasons for 
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emphasising the means other than missiles include: trucks, planes, and boats are less 
expensive than missiles; non-missile means can covertly be developed and employed; 
such means can more accurately be used by non-state groups; and non-missile means 
could avoid US missile defence systems. (US  NIE 2002; Pincus 2002a.) Still, ballistic 
missile defence constitutes an essential structure of Bush’s neo-deterrence framework. 
 
Nostalgia for Ballistic Missile Defence 
 
For almost a decade since the end of the Cold War debates over the BMD and the ABM 
Treaty had largely been confined in Capital Hill. During the first term of the Clinton 
administration, Reagan’s original Star Wars programme was put to an end and the BMD 
began to move towards theatre missile defence (TMD). As a result of the 1994 
congressional elections, however, the right- led Republicans held in both houses. And 
the pendulum swung again to a national missile defence (NMD) while keeping options 
for the TMD open for further development. By the end of 1995 the Republicans had 
succeeded by legislation in mandating the development of a multi-site ground-based 
NMD system for deployment by 2003. (Fitzgerald 2000, 492.) Clinton administration’s 
stance on BMD since then tended to deal with the problem by compromising with the 
Republicans while at the same time trying to evade being overruled by them. 
A 1995 intelligence estimate held that except Russia and China, no country 
would develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 
48 states and Canada ‘in the next 5 years’ before 2010 at the earliest. Prior to the 
publication of the estimate, according to Michael Dobbs, the Clinton administration had 
leaked its details to congressional Democrats who used it to build up opposition to 
NMD. Republican proponents of NMD system, on the other hand, were highly critical 
of national intelligence forecasts during the Clinton years. Curt Weldon, chairperson of 
the House Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on military research and 
development took the offensive against the Democrats’ arguments in Capitol Hill. 
In addition to a series of events that prompted the shift in intelligence forecasts 
such as missile tests in North Korea and Iran, and nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, 
Dobbs reveals, there was a ‘concerted campaign’ by the Republican-dominated 
Congress, ‘supported by Israel’, designed to focus attention on the leakage of missile 
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technology from Russia to Iran. Congressional Republicans were working for an 
increased public support for a NMD system. Israel’s then Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu feared that his country could soon become a target of Iranian missiles. 
Congressional Republicans tried hard to influence the CIA to revise its 1995 
estimate of the ballistic missile threat but could not manage to do so. Subsequently, 
however, they were successful in getting a blue-ribbon panel led by former CIA director 
Robert Gates appointed by Congress. The Gates panel reported to Congress in 
December 1996 that ‘rogue’ states would be unlikely to acquire ICBMs in the 
foreseeable future from the technological analysis. 
Israel, according to Dobbs, made strong allega tions to the Clinton 
administration that Russian missile experts were advising Iranians who were working 
on a upgraded Scud missile, Shahab-3, which the Israelis argued would be capable of 
attacking Tel Aviv from western Iran. The Clinton administration was sceptical of these 
allegations and did not want to jeopardise its relations with President Boris Yeltsin. 
However, the Israeli campaign was effective to the extent that a series of congressional 
hearings were held in 1997 and 1998. As a result, the Republican-dominated Congress 
passed in June 1998 the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanction Act, under which it was 
mandatory to impose sanctions on any country selling missile technology to Iran. 
Clinton vetoed the legislation. (Dobbs 2002.) 
However, quite a different forecast was made in July 1998 by a congressionally 
appointed commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld that a ‘rogue’ state would be able to 
inflict a major destruction on the US ‘within about five years’ of a decision to develop 
an ICBM. The US might not be aware for several of those years, however, that such a 
decision had been made.3 The ‘five years’ was the estimate based on information from 
missile engineers at major US arms contractors. (Ibid.) 
It has been known that the testing and deployment of NMD and even some 
versions of TMD would breach the ABM Treaty. The Clinton administration had 
negotiated with Moscow for a clarification of the ABM Treaty with a view to exempting 
some proposed TMD systems from being banned under the terms of the treaty. The 
result was a September 1997 agreement that exempted a Theatre High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD), a system for an ‘upper-tier’ defence designed to intercept missiles 
of relatively longer ranges high in the atmosphere. (Arms Control Reporter, 1997, 
 - 116 - 
603.D.43.) 
To be in a position to conduct testing and an eventual deployment of the NMD, 
however, without violating the treaty, a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty seemed to 
have been one option even during the Clinton administration. On 20 January 1999, for 
instance, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Cohen said at a Pentagon’s news 
briefing that if the Russians should refuse to amend the ABM Treaty the US could 
‘exercise its right to withdraw’ from the treaty, although he added the US had an interest 
in maintaining the treaty. (Ibid., 1999, 603.B-3.1.) 
On the same occasion Cohen announced a major restructuring of its NMD 
programme. The Pentagon’s chief said that two criteria must be satisfied for a 
deployment. Since the first criterion, a ‘threat to warrant the deployment’, would soon 
be met, the remaining criterion would be technological readiness, he said. The aim of 
the NMD would be to protect the entirety of the US. If this aim could not be met by 
deploying a system at ‘only’ the Grand Forks, North Dakota, multiple deployment sites 
might be necessary. Furthermore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and 
Threat Reduction Ted Warner, who was with Cohen, confirmed that deterrence against 
‘rogue’ states was not enough but that the continued ‘central focus’ of US deterrence 
was ‘vis-à-vis Russia and China’. And some administration officials were even talking 
about an expanded NMD with a deployment of 200 interceptors in Alaska in 2005 and 
an additional 100 interceptors in a second site within a decade or so. (Ibid., 
603.B-3.1-3.4.) 
The US House on 21 May 1999 adopted a bill on the National Missile Defense 
which committed the US to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective 
National Missile Defense system capable of defending the US territory aga inst limited 
ballistic missile attack. President Clinton signed the bill into law on 23 July 1999, 
although he said a final decision on deployment would be made in 2000 based on four 
criteria: technological readiness, the maturity of the ICBM threat by ‘rogue’ states, cost 
factors, and arms control considerations. (Cerniello 1999.) 
Earlier NMD bills, introduced in March 1998, had been defeated first in May 
and for the second time in September 1998. But the release of the Rumsfeld report in 
July 1998, DPRK’s Taepo Dong missile test, Secretary of Defense Cohen’s 
announcement on the restructuring of the NMD programmer in January 1999 seemed to 
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have helped Congressional proponents of the NMD. The Clinton administration now 
had a NMD deployment plan by 2003, spending 3 years for designing and testing and 
additional 3 years for deployment -- ‘three-plus-three’ programme (Arms Control 
Reporter, 1999, 603.B-3.3-3.4.) 
The 1999 decisions on the NMD were ‘[o]ne of the curious things’, observes 
Frances Fitzgerald, because there had been very little public discussion of the 
BMD during the several years by then and hence ‘no public pressure’ either on the 
Clinton administration or Congress to make such a decision. (Fitzgerald 2000, 499.) 
As it turned out, President Clinton had to announce his decision ‘not to 
authorize deployment’ of the NMD because the information available was still to be 
convincing enough to justify a decision otherwise in terms of technology and 
operational effectiveness of the entire system. In the same statement at Georgetown 
University on 1 September 2000, he also found it necessary to refer to arms control 
dimension of the problem. The NMD, if deployed, Clinton stated, would require the US 
either to adjust the ABM treaty or to withdraw from it because ‘by its very words’, 
NMD ‘prohibits any national missile defense’. (Clinton 2000, 1991-2.) Lacking his own 
bold initiative towards nuclear disarmament, however, Clinton was unable to reconcile 
his conflicting positions -- largely unsuccessful negotiations with the Russians for a 
revision of the ABM Treaty to allow development and deployment of some ballistic 
missile defences, and repeated compromises with the NMD proponents to avoid being 
branded as ‘weak on defence’. Immaturity in BMD technologies might have saved him 
from political quagmire. 
 
The Logic of Ballistic Missile Defence 
 
Ballistic missile defence (BMD) has usually meant to protect a second strike 
capabilities after absorbing a preemptive attack by the other side. The side which 
deploys BMDs might therefore be viewed by the other side as having capabilities and 
intention of launching preemptive strike against nuclear missile force of the other side 
(counterforce) in order to deprive it of its capabilities to respond. 
Feasibility of BMD technologies has always been open to question even from 
the late 1950s, however. In 1967 Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense under 
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President Johnson, admitted that the problem is not the money itself but the 
‘penetrability’ of the proposed shield to protect American population. (McNamara 1968, 
64.) He cautioned to distinguish an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system designed to 
protect cities and ABM systems for other purposes including for the protection of US 
strategic offensive forces and a light system against the emerging nuclear capability of 
China. Late in 1967 the US decided to go forward with the Chinese-oriented ABM 
deployment. (Ibid., 163-165.) 
In 1969 President Richard Nixon switched from the Sentinel ABM programme 
of the Johnson administration to a Safeguard programme. He had to justify the decision 
on the grounds that the ABM programme under development was unable to defend 
American cities ‘without an unacceptable loss of life ’ but that the only means to save 
lives was to ‘prevent war ’ and the best prevention for war was to protect US ‘deterrent’, 
the missile sites. The Safeguard was to protect US nuclear ‘deterrent’ against not only 
any attack by China foreseen ‘over the next 10 years’ but also against irrational or 
accidental attack from the USSR. (Nixon 1969, 208-209.) 
If the US and USSR had not engaged themselves in nuclear arms race, they 
need not have concluded the ABM treaty in 1972. The treaty was only a stopgap for the  
two nuclear superpowers to confirm and maintain their relations of mutual assured 
destruction, or MAD, and to refrain from developing and deploying, except at the 
agreed site(s), defensive systems designed to intercept the other side’s ballistic missiles. 
To President Reagan the state of MAD was humiliating in the sense that the US 
strategic nuclear force and the people were kept as hostage to nuclear missiles from the 
‘evil empire’. He wanted to get out of that condition unilaterally by a ‘strategic 
revolution’ capable of ‘overcoming’ deterrence. The means he embraced was the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of rendering incoming nuclear missiles ‘impotent and 
obsolete’. (Reagan 1983.) Reagan’s SDI included technological developments for 
space-based X-ray lasers, particle beams, and electromagnetic rail guns, without 
however achieving feasible results but only costing over $35 billion. 4 
The next candidate of BMD was senior Bush’s Global Protection Against 
Limited Strikes (GPALS) to protect the US from an intentional missile attack by Third 
World countries or accidental Soviet missiles. (Fitzgerald 2000, 484.) The concept of 
GPALS included space-based deployment of a thousand of ‘Brilliant Pebbles’ (tiny 
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kinetic-energy weapons stuffed with miniaturised computers and high- technology 
sensors), coupled with five hundred to one thousand ground-based interceptors at the 
estimated cost of $40 billion. (Ibid., 481, 484.) In December 1991 at the time of the 
collapse of the USSR, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organisation (SDIO) was 
working on two deployment plans: a congressional deployment plan of one hundred 
ground-based BMD interceptors at a single site in five years (mandated by the Missile 
Defense Act of 1991, legislated by Sam Nunn-John Warner bill) plus GPALS. The two 
deployment plans were abandoned the next year, however. (Ibid., 486-487.) 
It has been known at least among those more or less informed of BMD that 
technologies for such a defence could be nullified by relatively cheap countermeasures.5 
This is why realist proponents have not failed to caution that BMD’s goals are limited. 
President Bush laid special emphasis on the ICBM threat by ‘rogue’ states. 
(Bush 2001a.) According to one of his aides Paul Wolfowitz, the US BMD programme 
is ‘not Star Wars’ to build an impenetrable shield around the US. He cautioned that 
defences would ‘not need to be 100% effective’ to make a significant contribution to 
deterrence. BMD is ‘just one element ’ of a new deterrence framework which includes 
several mutually-reinforcing layers of deterrence such as diplomacy, arms control, 
counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and smaller but effective offensive nuclear 
forces. Denying that the programme was a ‘scarecrow’ defence, Wolfowitz stated that 
the BMD systems were intended to be expanded incrementally from initial deployment 
at the earliest possible moment to an ‘increasingly sophisticated mix’ of capabilities 
providing ‘layered defenses’ against all ranges of missiles at all stages of flight. 
(Wolfowitz 2001.) These points are also stated in the NPR 2002. The BMD is 
considered ‘most effective’ in ‘layered’ systems. The US is seeking such defences 
against attacks by ‘small numbers of longer range missiles’ and against attacks by 
‘larger number of short- and medium-range missiles’. (US NPR 2002, Excerpts, 25.) 
The Pentagon is exploring a wide range of alternative systems, including several 
near-term and mid-term options and improved versions of these options.6 
President Bush has stated that the mission for BMD is to ‘protect all 50 states’, 
US deployed forces, and US friends and allies. It is admitted in the US NPR 2002, 
however, that the BMD ‘can be less than 100-percent effective ’. (Ibid., 25.) A fact that 
BMD is, and will be, incapable of protecting human lives even if it may have a 
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capability to defend part of the military assets illustrates an irony of the dehumanised 
nuclear deterrence. 
Why BMD projects have recurred in various versions from time to time? There 
have been ‘dreamers’ and ‘schemers’ of the missile defence, pointed out Bill Keller. 
The dreamers, most notably Ronald Reagan, envisaged a US shielded by the 
impermeable superdome. His advisors such as Robert McFarlane and Colin Powell, 
however, cynically saw the president’s SDI as a ‘pipe dream’ but also as a useful 
bargaining chip with the Soviets. Current dreamers, Keller wrote, ‘possibly including 
the president ’, junior George W. Bush, embrace the BMD ‘at face value’ as the means 
of protection against terrorists’ ballistic missiles, or an accidental missile launch from 
Russia or a ‘rogue’ state’s attack. Current schemers, on the other hand, Keller continued, 
fear that the US may be ‘deter[red]’ by any nation armed with a few nuclear arms from 
projecting superior conventional forces into the world in a vein similar to how the US 
did to the USSR in Germany during the Cold War. The ‘real logic ’ of the BMD to these 
schemers, Keller pointed out, is not to defend but to ‘protect American freedom to 
attack’. Keller quoted from Keith B. Payne, one of such long-time schemers, who 
defined this logic as making the stakes of ‘power projection’ compatible with the risks 
of power projection. (Keller 2002.) 
Another interpretation of the logic of the BMD is made by Frances Fitzgerald. 
For many of the SDI proponents the goal was to establish ‘U.S. control over space’. 
These experts saw that Star Wars technologies were much better suited to the ‘offense’ 
than to the defence, although this was taboo while the US-Soviet nuclear arms race 
continued. (Fitzgerald 2000, 490.) In the current BMD programme, too, she sees the 
real goal as acquiring ‘weapons in space’ which, ‘if matured technologically’, could be 
used for an ‘offense’ while also providing a ‘defense’ for the US. (Ibid., 499.) In this 
connection, it should be borne in mind, Pentagon emphasises ‘space control’ on the 
ground that in future military competition the exploitation of space and the denial of the 
use of space to adversaries will be a ‘key objective’. (US QDR 2001, 7.) 
Both of the above observations seem to apply to Bush’s BMD when seen in the 
light of his administration’s nuclear weapons policy. We shall see Bush’s proposed 
reductions in strategic nuclear warheads to examine it and the BMD in an overall 
context. 
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New Framework of Proposed Nuclear Reductions  
 
Bush’s new proposal for the reductions in US-Russian strategic nuclear warheads was 
made on 13 November 2001 on the occasion of his meeting with Russian President 
Putin. At a White House news conference with Putin at his side, Bush announced that 
the US would reduce its ‘operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads’ to a range 
between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade by 2012. He justified this decision by 
saying that the current levels of US nuclear forces did not reflect post-Cold War 
strategic realities and that the new decision would be ‘fully consistent with American 
security’. (Bush 2001b, 1652.) 
At the same news conference, Russian President Putin stated that his dialogue 
with Bush had to do with the prospects of reaching a ‘reliable and verifiable agreement’ 
on further reductions in the US and Russian arms. Regarding Bush’s decision to reduce 
strategic offensive weapons, the Russian president said that the Kremlin would try to 
‘respond in kind’. Putin added that the Russians were prepared to present all their 
agreements ‘in a treaty form’, including the issues of verification and control. (Ibid., 
1654-5.) Then, Bush said if he needed to write down an agreement ‘on a piece of paper’, 
he would be glad to do that. But his position was that since the US and Russia were in a 
new relationship based on ‘trust and cooperation’, they did not need an ‘arms control 
agreement’ or ‘arms control negotiations’ to reduce their weapons. (Ibid., 1655-6.) Later 
at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC, Putin reiterated that Russia would accept 
agreements ‘only in treaty form’, including the issues of verification and control. (De 
Young and Milbank 2001.) An ultimate form of bilateral accord(s) remains to be seen. 
Pentagon’s Crouch elaborated on Bush’s proposed reductions at the briefing on 
the US NPR, stating that in addition to the 1,300 START accountable warheads that 
would come off the force, the US would be taking additional ‘operationally deployed 
warheads’ off existing ICBMs and SLBMs down to a level of about 3,800 by FY 2007. 
The US force size, he said, is not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia, 
both politically and in terms of Russia’s nuclear reductions. (US NPR 2002, Briefing.) 
Bush’s proposed number of reductions to a range of 1,700-2,200 is smaller by 
some 300 than the lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for 
each to be established by 31 December 2007, as included in the Clinton-Yeltsin ‘Joint 
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Statement On Parameters On Future Reductions In Nuclear Forces’ [STARTIII] (Arms 
Control Reporter, 1997, 614.D.25-26.) Here are tricks. 
First, Bush talks about ‘operationally deployed’ strategic nuclear warheads. 
However, about 400 warheads are on weapons systems that are being ‘overhauled’ at 
any given time, pointed out Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay. Consequently, Bush’s 
proposed reduction number is ‘actually slightly higher’ than the Clinton-Yeltsin levels 
of 2,000-2,500. The Bush administration has counted only operationally deployed 
nuclear warheads by changing the traditional rules for counting strategic warheads 
which included all deployed warheads as forces in the active inventory, irrespective of 
their actual conditions -- some of them were incapable of being delivered as they were 
in the process of being refurbished or inspected. (Daalder and Lindsay 2002, 4.) 
Secondly, the operationally deployed strategic force is intended for dealing 
with immediate and unexpected contingencies. The US, Crouch admitted, would 
maintain the force structure and the warheads taken off these systems as part of the 
‘responsive force’. The responsive force capability is to ‘augment’ the operationally 
deployed force and will be ‘additional warheads’ that could be uploaded back onto that 
force if necessary. The responsive capability would reside in the ‘active stockpile’. (US 
NPR 2002, Briefing.) 
US nuclear warheads are stockpiled in two categories, ‘active’ and ‘inactive’. 
The active stockpiles are ‘ready-for-use’ warheads with the ‘latest warhead 
modifications’, with tritium and other limited life components installed. The inactive 
stockpiles are without such modifications and with no limited life components 
installed.7 The size of the inactive stockpile is still to be fixed. At least ‘seven types’ of 
nuclear warheads are to be refurbished to extend their lives over the next two decades. 
(US NPR 2002, Excerpts, 31-32.) 
 
No Destruction of Nuclear Warheads  
 
The nuclear warheads removed from operational deployment are not necessarily to be 
destroyed. No US-USSR/Russian nuclear arms control agreements, for that matter, have 
obliged the parties to destroy warheads. Destruction is different from dismantlement. 
When US officials and experts talk about ‘destroying’, according to John 
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Harvey of the Department of Energy (DoE), they talk basically about ‘dismantling’ the 
warheads, taking the components that are not needed and disposing of them, but making 
sure that they still can take good care of the safety and security of nuclear weapon 
materials from the warhead. (US NPR 2002, Briefing.) 
Nuclear warheads involve the most sensitive technologies and both the US and 
Russia had not addressed problems of warhead destruction. Only in their March 1997 
understandings Presidents Clinton and Yeltzin included in the agenda of future 
negotiations on a START III measures relating to the ‘transparency of strategic nuclear 
warhead inventories’ and the ‘destruction of strategic nuclear warheads’. (Arms Control 
Reporter, 1997, 614.D.25.) Since then neither side seems to have taken any concrete 
initiative towards this end. 
Regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Pentagon’s 
Crouch said, the US will continue to oppose its ratification, adding that it will also 
continue to adhere to a testing moratorium. However, in connection with the time period 
necessary for preparation to conduct a nuclear test, Crouch stated, the NPR recommends 
to shorten the time than the current 2-3 years (24 to 36 months) from a decision. The 
DoE feels confident, added John Harvey, that it can do the requirements for the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program without nuclear testing. Since there are no guarantees, 
he commented, the US needs to retain, as part of stockpile stewardship, an ability to 
carry out a test. (US NPR 2002, Briefing.) The DoD and the National Nuclear Safety 
Administration (NNSA) are to improve ‘test scenarios’ with a view to determining, 
implementing, and sustaining the ‘optimum test readiness time’. (US NPR 2002, 
Excerpts, 36.) The need is emphasised to maintain readiness to ‘resume underground 
nuclear testing’ if required. (Ibid., 30.) 
Asked whether the US was not going to try to develop ‘smaller nuclear 
weapons, earth-penetrators’, Crouch’s reply was not definitively negative. He simply 
said there were ‘no recommendations ’ in the NPR about developing new nuclear 
weapons but added that the US was trying to look at a ‘number of initiatives’, including 
modifying an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against hard targets and 
deeply-buried targets. (US NPR 2002, Briefing.) 
Crouch’s remarks were later clarified by retired General John Gordon, head of 
the NNSA, who together with Crouch co-chaired NPR works. In a testimony before the 
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Senate Armed Services Committee on 19 February 2002, Gordon stated, the Nuclear 
Weapons Council (with officials from the Pentagon and DoE as members) had ordered a 
three-year study into developing a nuclear-tipped, earth-penetrating weapon capable of 
destroying hardened underground targets, and that the three nuclear weapons 
laboratories now had ‘advanced warhead concept teams’ working on new warheads and 
warhead modifications. (Pincus 2002b.) 
In fact, a group of politicians, military officials, and leaders of US nuclear 
weapon laboratories have argued for the development of a new generation of precision 
low-yield nuclear weapons, wrote Robert W. Nelson. They have suggested that such 
weapons could be used in conventional conflicts with Third world countries. The one 
clear scenario Nelson found is an intended use of new nuclear weapons as a ‘substitute 
for conventional weapons’ for attacking deeply buried targets. Such uses would cause 
‘massive radioactive contamination’, Nelson pointed out. (Nelson 2001, 1, 5.) Actually, 
the US nuclear posture review emphasises the need to develop new capabilities to 
destroy ‘hard and deeply buried targets’ (HDBT), to find and attack ‘mobile and 
relocatable targets’, to defeat chemical or biological agents (agent defeat), and to limit 
‘collateral’ damage. (US NPR 2002, Excerpts, 46.) 
Crouch referred to a ‘new framework’ the US would be creating to achieve the 
proposed reductions in ‘operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads’, without 
waiting for ‘Cold War arms control treaties’. Instead, the new framework is premised on 
other kinds of US capabilities in the future, i.e. greater emphasis both on missile 
defence capabilities and on the development of advanced conventional capabilities, he 
noted. (US NPR 2002, Briefing.) 
The new US nuclear posture involves maintenance of nuclear arsenals in 
constantly updated and improved operational condition, reductions in operationally 
deployed warheads to a lower level calculated to be higher enough to sustain its 
unilateral nuclear deterrent, developing and deploying BMD, and integrating nuclear 
weapons with conventional weapons systems under a more synthesised system of 
command, control, communication, intelligence, and adaptive planning. 
The previous US Nuclear Posture Review under the Clinton administration was 
characterised by then Secretary of Defense William Perry as achieving proper ‘balance’ 
between ‘leading’ in further reductions in nuclear weapons and ‘hedging’ against a 
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reversal of reform in Russia. (US NPR 1994.) Naturally, what guided US nuclear 
weapons policy were much more ‘hedges’ than ‘leading’. According to then US Deputy 
Secretary of Defense John Deutch who testified on US NPR 1994 before a meeting of 
the House Foreign Affairs committee in October 1994, the authors of the secret 
Pentagon document judged that deeper unilateral reductions in strategic nuclear 
warheads would be ‘imprudent’ and that actions be taken to ensure that the US could 
‘reconstitute’ its retired nuclear warheads if it would need to. One of the reasons for the 
two judgements was the ‘uncertain future’ of the rapid political and economic change in 
Russia. (Deutch 1994.) The US ‘hedge’ was conceptualised late in the 1980s and was 
adopted as the key guideline for the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. (Kristensen 2001, 
8-9.) The ‘hedge’ in the form of nuclear warheads retired from active service but kept in 
reserve as part of the responsive force is one of the conspicuous features in the 2002 US 
NPR, too. 
The US is estimated to be possessing some 9,376 ‘operational’ nuclear 
warheads (including tactical weapons) while an estimated number of the Russian 
warheads is 9,196, in addition to ‘non-operational’ warheads (including tactical 
weapons), both in active and inactive stockpiles, which are estimated at 5,000 and 
13,500 respectively for the US and Russia, as of January 2001. (Kristensen 2001, 9.) 
 
Changes in the US Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy 
 
The essence of US nuclear weapons policy resides in the employment plan of its 
weapons. The only country today that is technically in a position to strike the US with 
nuclear arms is Russia, whether accidentally or preemptively or in retaliation. The US 
nuclear war plan is still formulated with this fact as the fundamental premise. If Russia 
is no longer an enemy of the US, then what about the existing nuclear war plan against 
Russia? Would the US seek to discard its top-secret Single Integrated Operational Plan 
(SIOP) by asking Russia to act together towards the same end? 
SIOP’s ‘deliberate’ executable war plans are for anticipated contingencies. At 
present the time required to work out a plan to strike one specific new target is 12-48 
hours. SIOP’s planning method in the near future is intended to be replaced by 
‘adaptive’ planning which is expected to formulate war plans flexibly ‘in time 
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critical-situations’. (US NPR 2002, Excerpts, 29.)8 
Requirements for the employment capabilities of nuclear weapons are 
categorised as immediate, potential or unexpected. ‘Immediate’ contingencies include 
ongoing dangers such as an attack by Iraq on Israel or its neighbours, or an attack by 
DPRK on the Republic of Korea, or an armed conflict over the status of Taiwan. 
‘Potential’ contingencies involve ‘plausible ’ dangers including the emergence of an 
adversarial military coalition against the US. And ‘unexpected’ contingencies include 
unforeseen developments such as a ‘sudden regime change’ with existing nuclear arms 
coming under the control of a hostile leadership. (Ibid., 16.) 
In 1997 President Clinton signed a new presidential decision directive (PDD) 
with a major reformulation of US nuclear war planning. At that time the revised target 
list of US strategic missiles on immediate alert, mostly in Russia and some in China, 
grew from about 2,500 in 1995 to roughly 3,000, while hundreds of secondary targets 
are in China, DPRK, Iran, and Iraq. (Smith 1997; Blair 2000.) In 2002 the DPRK, Iran, 
Iraq, and newly added Libya and Syria are categorised as involved in all three 
contingencies. (US NPR 2002, Excerpts, 16.) China could be involved in an immediate 
or potential category. (Ibid., 16-17.) A Russian contingency is ‘plausible’ but is ‘not 
expected’. To adjust immediate nuclear force requirements involving Russia with the 
recognition of the changed relationship with that country is a ‘critical step’ away from 
the Cold War balance of terror policy, the NPR said. However, Russia’s nuclear forces 
and programmes still remain a ‘concern’. If US relations with Russia ‘significantly 
worsen’ in the future, the US may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture. 
(Ibid., 17.) 
It is presumed that some 2,200 Russian targets are being held at risk today, 
including 1,100 nuclear force targets, 160 leadership targets, 500 conventional force 
targets, and 500 war-supporting industry targets. (Daalder and Lindsay 2002, 5.) The 
US nuclear arsenals would include some 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads 
even after Bush’s proposed reductions have been made, in addition to thousands of 
additional warheads in the responsive force. Then, if Russia is ‘not expected’ to be 
involved in a nuclear contingency, these arsenals should be both too large and too 
destructive to be allocated to the presumed targets in China, DPRK, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
and Syria. It could be assumed that the US arsenals are in anticipation of a Russian 
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contingency as a ‘hedge’ and that a new generation of nuclear weapons is being urged 
for development to be prepared for contingencies involving the rest of target countries. 
The US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has been ordered to draft 
‘contingency plans’ for the use of nuclear weapons under three possible circumstances: 
against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack; in retaliation to the attack by 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; and in the event of surprising military 
development. (Arkin 2002.) 
Bush administration’s policy on nuclear weapons remains unchanged in its 
basic concept from the strategic thinking during the Cold War era. Some vocal changes 
seem to have been made, however. Bush’s new policy has been formulated in a situation 
different from the Cold War era in the sense that Russia, the successor state of the USSR, 
is no longer a peer competitor in new arms drive. The Bush administration is trying to 
surpass Clinton administration’s stance of ‘leading’ in reduction of strategic nuclear 
warheads by setting down rules unilaterally, with ‘hedging’ by a New Triad as a fresh 
starting point towards an unrivalled superiority. The US aim seems to be in the 
ascendancy over the Russians not only in nuc lear weaponry but in advanced 
conventional areas, on the one hand, while minimising potential threat from Russian 
nuclear weapons capabilities and neutralising such capabilities, on the other. 9 
 
New Configuration and ‘National Security’ Syndrome 
 
In spite of rhetorical statements often exchanged between leaders of the former Cold 
War rivals that they are no longer enemies, not only nuclear war preparedness remains 
basically unchanged but a new configuration of power relations is being formed in the 
processes of managing the legacies of the Cold War confrontation. 
In the wake of the September 11th incident in 2001, the Bush administration 
has succeeded in forming a new coalition in its war against terrorism by mustering 
support not only from its Western allies but also from those countries that had not had 
so smooth relations with the US, including Russia and China, and Pakistan and India 
that had been under US sanctions in the wake of their 1998 nuclear tests. By a 
geopolitical strategy the US has enticed leaders of some former Soviet republics in 
Central Asia to provide forward deployment bases for the war in Afghanistan in return 
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for economic assistance for these leaders who should have been branded as ‘unsavoury 
dictators’ in the traditional criteria of ‘democracy’. 
The major players of adversarial relations have changed seemingly from the 
Cold War era. Unchanged is the continued search for sources of a threat or threats to 
justify new arms buildup and military measures in the name of ‘national security’. 
During the Cold War, the ideological rationale of the US-Soviet confrontation was the 
struggle between ‘Communist totalitarianism’ and ‘US imperialism’, a struggle propped 
by respective alliances but basically driven by the traditional concept of ‘national 
security’. The end of the Cold War stripped the former adversaries of their ideological 
cover, and thriving now is a syndrome of jingoistic ‘national security’ justified in terms 
of myopic ‘national interests’ which their leaders define from time to time often in 
terms of geopolitical strategies. Military power remains the main thrust of foreign 





As long as the US continues to go ahead with its current nuclear weapons policy with a 
view to remaining the unrivalled military power, there is little reason to expect that 
Russia’s response will be simple acquiescence to Washington’s assertiveness. Since the 
two nuclear giants are not moving towards a decisive nuclear disarmament, the 
second-tier and unacknowledged NWSs will have no incentive to take any new 
initiative towards that end. China is observed to be adding to its ICBM capabilities and 
developing an SSBN fleet. The UK joined the US in conducting a sub-critical nuclear 
test in Nevada in February 2002. India and Pakistan will continue to strengthen their 
status as de facto nuclear weapon states. So will Israel whose nuclear weapon status has 
remained unchecked by its US partner. 
There are no ready-made panaceas likely to bring about an easy breakthrough 
out of this impasse. Instead, there should be a series of initiatives that could usher in a 
new phase of breakthroughs in nuclear disarmament. Such initiatives may be taken by 
all conceivable actors, states and NGOs, in the form of criticisms, new ideas, proposals, 
recommendations, and actions. 
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Initial suggestions for moves that culminated in both bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and measures such as the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs), INF treaty, even during 
the Cold War, were all made by individuals, experts, peace movements, and concerned 
states. The end of the Cold War was followed by START I,11  Bush-Gorbachev 
exchange of unilateral steps removing tactical nuclear arms from surface ships, 
additional NWFZs, and the still to be effective CTBT.  
Certainly, governments of the NWSs only took up those problems they had 
found manageable and cooked up end products to their liking. At least, however, they 
had to respond to outside initiatives when they sensed they better had to do so in view 
of domestic political situation and international relations. 
In the light of the facts that the US holds the key to moves towards nuclear 
disarmament, and that the US domestic politics is very much tainted by jingoistic 
nationalism especially in the wake of the September 11th incident, it may for some time 
be domestic situational factors such as economic difficulties in continuing high level of 
military spending and technological hurdles in the development of BMD that can help 
domestic public opinion show discontent with the administration’s nuclear weapons 
policy. Nevertheless, such processes can be facilitated through the influences exerted 
upon the US administration and public opinion by the wider international relations 
involving not only governments but NGOs, as was the case in the late years of the 
Reagan administration. 
Nevertheless, even leading proponents of nuclear arms control in the US have 
not gone far enough to advocate total nuclear disarmament. They have either remained 
ambiguous about the final goal or argued for the reduction up to some 1,000 or so 
nuclear warheads -- a position still retaining ‘nuclear deterrent ’ even if at a lower 
level.12 The global situation has changed and the concept of nuclear deterrence is in the 
minority, as evidenced by the fact that the five NWSs had to reaffirm in New York on 1 
May 2000 their commitment to the fulfillment of all their nuclear disarmament 
obligations under the NPT. (Arms Control Reporter, 2000, 602.D.26-29.) 
It is proper here to recall that growing criticisms of the Cold War by 
international public opinion, including citizens, experts, and peace movements, bore a 
theoretical fruit in the Palme Commission’s findings, one of which gives expression to a 
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common-sense truth that the goal of arms control and disarmament is the pursuit of 
‘common gains, not unilateral advantage’. The current ‘expedient of deterrence through 
armaments’, it continues, must be replaced by a doctrine of ‘common security’. (Palme 
Commission 1982, 139.) At a time when ‘national security’ syndrome is thriving, the 
basic concept of ‘common security’ should be resurrected and enriched for the common 





1 The traditional ‘smaller triad’ of strategic forces -- Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 
bombers, and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) -- is ‘embedded’ in the new triad, 
according to US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J. D. Crouch 
who gave a special briefing on the NPR. (US NPR 2002, Briefing.) 
2 US National Intelligence Estimate 2002, classified, is the 4th annual report, and was sent to the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
3 The report of the Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known 
as the Rumsfeld Commission) was released on 15 July 1998. (Arms Control Reporter, 1998, 
706.B.271-272.) 
4 For Reagan’s SDI and its fundamental political, strategic, and technological contradictions, see 
Tachibana 1989, esp. 304-325. Fitzgerald 2000 is an excellent work on Reagan’s SDI and its 
follow-ons. 
5 Lewis, Postol, and Pike 1999 elucidate why BMD would not function effectively. 
6 Only the PAC-3 (Army’s upgraded Patriot) systems are under deployment since 1991. Near-term 
and mid-term options (2003-2008) include: a single Airborne Laser for ‘boost-phase’ intercepts 
for limited operations against missiles of all ranges; a ‘rudimentary ground-based midcourse’ 
system with a small number of interceptors against ‘long-range’ missiles; and a ‘sea-based’ Aegis 
system for a ‘rudimentary midcourse’ capability against ‘short to medium-range’ missiles. 
Deployment of operational capabilities beginning in the 2006-2008 period include: 2-3 Airborne 
Laser aircraft; additional ground-based midcourse sites; 4 sea-based midcourse ships; and 
terminal systems including PAC-3 and THAAD. (US NPR 2002, Excerpts, 26.) In January 2002, 
the Pentagon reorganised the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) into the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA). Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) had been 
changed to BMDO by Clinton. 
7 John Harvey, Director, Department of Energy’s Office of Planning, Assessment and Analysis, who 
was with Crouch at the same Pentagon briefing on the NPR, explained that the ‘limited-life 
components’ that go into a nuclear warheads, such as tritium, neutron generators, things that live 
for a relatively short period of time, are removed from the warhead, and when the weapon is 
transitioned to the active stockpile from the inactive, they are reinstalled in the warhead. (US NPR 
2002, Briefing.) 
8 In March 2002 the US Nuclear Posture Review Report leaked out. Articles first published then 
include: Richter 2002; Arkin 2002; and Gordon 2002. 
9 The Bush administration has decided to continue funding the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Program, initiated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (sponsored by Senators 
Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar) to facilitate the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and 
destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union. For the initial period of the 
Nunn-Lugar programme, see Lockwood 1993, 566-571. Bush administration officials had 
threatened to reduce funding or eliminate the programme by criticising it as ill conceived and 
expensive. The decision seems to confirm the administration’s aim to help neutralise Russian 
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nuclear capabilities and, in light of the September 11th incident, to prevent possible smuggling of 
nuclear-related materials out of Russia. 
10 The US Congress in December 2001 finally authorised military spending of $343.3 billion for 
FY2002, the highest increase since the Reagan era. The Department of Defense’s budget request 
for FY2003 is about $380 billion. Russia’s military spending is estimated at about 1/60 of the US. 
11 On 5 December 2001, seven years after the 1991 START I treaty went into force, the US and 
Russia completed treaty-compliant reductions of their strategic nuclear arsenals down to the 
ceiling of deployed strategic warheads at about 6,000 each for the US and Russia. The other 
START I parties under a May 1992 agreement -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine -- complied 
with their treaty obligations much earlier by transferring all their nuclear warheads to Russia and 
subsequently by destroying strategic delivery vehicles. As the treaty does not oblige the parties to 
destroy nuclear warheads removed from the means of delivery, the number of strategic and 
tactical nuclear warheads retained by the US is estimated at more than 5,000 while the relevant 
number retained by Russia is estimated at 13,000. In addition, the US deploys about 200-400 
nuclear gravity bombs in Europe and keeps over 1,000 additional tactical nuclear arms in 
operational condition, while Russia, too, is regarded as deploying roughly 3,500 tactical nuclear 
arms. (Bleek 2002, 33.) 
12  For a review of suggestions and pronouncements by some US non-governmental research 
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